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This paper analyses the structure of the Internet marketplace and the business relationships of key players 
involved in network services provision. A brief overview of existing pricing policies and research work in 
this area is presented and some new issues are introduced. We believe that the role of information 
asymmetry is critical when considering agreements for Internet access and interconnection. In negotiation 
and contract preparation, information asymmetry gives rise to adverse selection. The current structure of 
connectivity agreements does not address information asymmetries thus allowing the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour in the form of moral hazard. Inasmuch as interconnection agreements involve 
sharing and/or exchanging network resources, either party will tend to exploit the agreement to its own 
advantage (i.e. conserving its own resources) and, possibly, to the detriment of the other (i.e. over-
utilising the other’s resources). The discussion focuses on interconnection agreements between Internet 
Service Providers, namely peering and transit. The paper concludes with an outline of an incentive 
compatible mechanism that can sustain quality of service requirements in interconnection agreements. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is structured hierarchically, comprising three main levels of participants, namely, end users, 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Internet Backbone Providers (IBP). End users are at the bottom of the 
hierarchy and access the Internet via ISPs. End users include residential and business customers. At the 
top of the hierarchy, IBPs own high speed and high capacity networks to provide global access and 
interconnectivity. They sell primarily wholesale Internet connectivity services to ISPs [Shriganesh, 1997]. 
ISPs then resell connectivity services or add value and sell new services to their customers. However, 
IBPs may also get involved in ISP business activities by selling retail Internet connectivity services to Ioanna D. Constantiou, Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos 
end-users. Both IBPs and ISPs provide complementary inputs to the bundled network services that end-
users consume [Foros and Kind, 2000]. 
This hierarchical value chain for Internet connectivity involves two main kinds of pricing contracts.  The 
first involves pricing between end-user and ISP for primary Internet access and the second involves 
pricing between ISP and IBP for interconnection. Thus, two markets for Internet connectivity are 
identified, wholesale and retail, for global access and for connectivity to end-users respectively [Huston, 
1999]. In the early days when the Internet was an activity restricted to the public sector, mainly for 
research and education purposes, access and interconnection were public goods and their provision was 
organized outside competitive markets. 
Internet provision and use today is primarily commercial, yet its basic architectures remain unchanged. 
Internet connectivity in itself possesses public good properties, the most pervasive being network 
externalities. The value for each individual participant, derived from the ‘network of networks’ increases 
exponentially with broader reach and greater participation. Similarly, inefficient utilization of network 
resources by one participant has detrimental effects on the quality of service received by others. 
Externalities generate powerful incentives for interconnection while setting the stage for potential 
opportunistic exploitation of shared network resources. 
Another key characteristic of the Internet is its variety and heterogeneity. Diverse technologies, 
applications and services inter-operate almost seamlessly, posing heterogeneous requirements for network 
resources. Heterogeneous end-users have diverse expectations from the network and make use of various 
technologies, applications and services. It is quite remarkable that such a complex commercial and 
technological ecosystem seems to operate without major breakdowns and the whole world effectively 
relies on it for a wide range of social and economic activities. 
Having said all that, there are credible signs that the simple market mechanisms governing internet 
connectivity are cracking under current pressures and may not be able to sustain future growth. In 
particular, flat rate pricing for primary access is consistent with the cost structure of Internet service 
provision [Mackie-Mason and Varian, 1995] but does little to control resource allocation under conditions 
of high demand (congestion) and/or in the presence of differentiated user demands and willingness to pay. 
For example a business user under pressure to complete a certain task may be willing to pay more in order 
to achieve higher transfer rates. Current Internet architectures mainly support ‘best effort’ service and 
pricing schemes cannot discriminate between users requiring high quality of service and casual web 
surfers. This problem is exacerbated during periods of high traffic or congestion, when efficient resource 
allocation becomes an even more pressing concern. 
The problem is more complicated once we realize that even if we devise an efficient and practical 
mechanism for resource allocation and price discrimination for primary access [Cremer et al. 1999], actual 
performance depends on the conditions and behavior of several networks that mediate data transmission 
throughout the world. In the past, ISPs have been agreeing to service each other’s traffic without charge, 
for their obvious mutual benefit. However, competitive market dynamics have tilted the balance in such 
peering agreements when, for example, one partner makes heavier use of another’s resources. Commercial 
wholesale contracts, on the other hand, cannot always verify or enforce the agreed performance levels. For 
example, a wholesale network provider may disguise his low effort (e.g. neglect to upgrade bottleneck 
network components) as adverse system-wide demand conditions. An even more elementary problem is to 
agree upon what constitutes performance, effort and cost and how that is built into an effective pricing 
scheme [Kende and Oxman, 1999].  
Information asymmetry is a key component of the problems sketched above. Participants in retail and 
wholesale markets for Internet connectivity lack full information regarding each other’s capacity, demand, Ioanna D. Constantiou, Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos 
resource allocation, effort and cost. [Cukier, 1998] As a result, they cannot enforce any contracts based on 
performance (quality of service) and they have an incentive to act opportunistically against each other (to 
take advantage of the other party’s poor information and deviate from agreed performance). 
This paper explores current practices and research work on access and interconnection agreements and 
outlines future research directions for taking information asymmetry explicitly into account. It is 
structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on pricing retail Internet access in the 
presence of quality of service (QoS) requirements. It explores the challenges faced, alternative solutions 
and their limitations. We argue that even if these problems are resolved at the retail end, QoS cannot be 
guaranteed unless the same requirements are propagated throughout the interconnectivity chain. Section 3 
turns to interconnection agreements between network providers. Current practices are discussed and their 
weaknesses are identified. Section 4 explores in detail the nature, manifestations and implications of 
asymmetric information in interconnection agreements. This section also sets out the requirements for 
sustainable QoS expectations from such agreements. Before concluding the paper, section 5 outlines a 
modeling approach to characterizing an incentive compatible mechanism for interconnection, satisfying 
such requirements. 
2. PRICING RETAIL INTERNET ACCESS 
Much of the existing work on Internet access pricing adopts the view that prices should be used to achieve 
efficient resource allocation.  In this context, the proper objective function is some measure of user 
satisfaction rather than cost parameters given ex-ante. Clearly, Internet access provision exhibits very low 
marginal cost, much like any other information good. Therefore, it is not surprising that competition 
drives actual prices to very low levels, even to nominal zero values [Jew and Nicholls, 1999] and that 
internet access is often bundled with other information services (e.g. AOL) [Bakos and Brynjlofsson, 
1997]. Consequently, pricing turns to consumer valuations as the basis for determining how much to 
charge. In the presence of heterogeneous user preferences regarding quality of service (i.e. delay and 
packet loss), the problem becomes a standard exercise in price discrimination. Using such models it is 
straightforward to show that that properly computed short run prices could give information about the 
value of capacity, and provide useful indications for network resource allocation. [Shriganesh, 1997] 
Further, an important element in some models is that users should be charged in a way that reflects the 
negative externalities they impose on others. Hence, if the capacity of the network is constrained, a user 
should be charged for the fact that the packets he transmits increase congestion and therefore decrease the 
utility of other users. If negative externalities are not charged for, information asymmetry (for example, 
the fact that the ISP cannot know whether the user is a casual web surfer or an urgent business client) 
gives end users an incentive to act opportunistically by ‘wasting’ network resources. 
The Internet raises specific problems once one turns to the much more complex issue of implementing 
these pricing schemes. One pricing problem is that a user would be made responsible for costs over which 
he has very little control as they depend on total network capacity and the behavior of other users. There 
are two issues here. 
One is incomplete information about network capacity and demand patterns. Even if a user makes the 
effort to collect relevant information from research reports, reputation or past experience, his information 
will always be incomplete vis-à-vis the informed ISP who has perfect knowledge of both (even if demand 
is not perfectly predictable). This information asymmetry can instigate ISP opportunism in the form of 
moral hazard. For example, an ISP might oversubscribe its network in order to maximize profitability at 
the detriment of customer service. Alternatively, with a pricing mechanism that charges for negative Ioanna D. Constantiou, Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos 
externality, and given that actual demand is stochastic and unobservable by the user, the ISP might 
discriminate his charges against certain customers in favor of more profitable ones. 
The second issue relates to a degree of risk that the user may have to bear under such pricing mechanisms. 
This risk involves receiving lower service quality for any given price or vice versa. Normally, in a 
principal-agent setting we expect the risk-neutral party (in this case the ISP) to absorb the risk facing the 
risk-averse party (in this case the end user). Inasmuch as the ISP also faces some risk from uncertain 
demand, this issue is further confounded and the efficient outcome is not obvious. 
The second pricing problem stems from the fact that the shadow prices of capacity vary over time, and it 
is possible that in some parts of the network where capacity is specially limited and demand especially 
bursty, these shadow prices may vary very fast. This makes it very difficult to organize a pricing scheme 
that tracks the correct shadow prices. Given that demand is stochastic and highly bursty, this problem can 
be pervasive. From a practical perspective, the user cannot handle the overhead of adjusting his behavior 
to dynamic, real time price variation.  
In their proposal for ‘smart markets’, McKie-Mason and Varian [McKie-Mason and Varian, 1995, 1996, 
1997], suggest the use of Vickrey auctions. In their implementation, each packet would carry a maximum 
price that the sender is willing to pay for the service. The network would accept to forward packets 
carrying a willingness to pay superior to a threshold computed in such away that the total number of 
packets that are transmitted equals available capacity. Although this approach yields a theoretical first best 
outcome, it faces obvious implementation obstacles (including, among others, network overheads and 
incompletely informed users). Furthermore, one might raise questions regarding the equity and fairness of 
the method, since some users may get served too late or never. 
In a series of papers, Gupta, Stahl and Whinston [e.g. Gupta et al., 1997 and 2000] have proposed 
alternative approaches for pricing Internet access dynamically. At every point of time the network is 
monitored for congestion. The prices charged for the nodes at which congestion is severe are increased, 
whereas the prices for nodes at which congestion is less severe are decreased. Each user of the network is 
informed dynamically of the prices and can decide whether or not to send packets accordingly. The 
authors have carried out simulated experiments to demonstrate that under broad conditions their algorithm 
tracks the equilibrium prices well. 
A key feature of the next generation Internet Protocol (IPv.6) is that it will support priority classes that 
data packets will be assigned, in order to satisfy QoS requirements of the application (e.g. email vs. 
videoconferencing) or of the user. This feature has been exploited in much of the research reviewed here. 
In particular, Clark’s [Clark, 1995] basic proposal gives users the opportunity to buy `priority flags', which 
can be attached to especially important packets. Priority classes can be used to implement a pricing 
mechanism based on expected capacity. The main advantages are performance predictability for the user 
(even though QoS may not be entirely guaranteed) and ease of implementation for the provider (no 
tracking of data). Moreover, this analysis captures directly the fact that the marginal cost of  traffic flow is 





Dynamic pricing mechanisms are `spot market' proposals. Although hey have significant efficiency traits 
[Edell and Varaiya, 1999], they have three main disadvantages. First, they are not suitable for applications 
requiring continuous availability of bandwidth, where demand cannot adjust dynamically. Second, they 
may pose significant information overheads to the network itself, which has to monitor traffic volumes on 
every node and notify end users. Third, they raise informational overhead for the user and are disruptive to 
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Psychological experiments [Bouch and Sasse, 1999] have demonstrated the latter effect and elaborated on 
its implications. In particular, it has been shown that users need predictable quality of service and real time 
feedback for tasks demanding high performance, while more ‘casual’ or less urgent tasks do not demand 
continuous feedback on network performance. Moreover, user willingness to pay is positively correlated 
with predictability of and confidence in network performance. In other words, Internet access pricing 
should not only reflect dynamic (spot) network conditions but also the overall, or long term quality of 
service, which shapes subjective user expectations. Therefore, dynamic pricing mechanisms are limited 
not only because they impose information overheads to the network and to the user but also because in the 
long run they turn out to be less efficient than what current models anticipate. 
This section discusses some approaches for service performance expectations of internet users. All these 
approaches face a fundamental limitation, namely that solving the problem at the retail end is insufficient 
unless the same requirements are propagated throughout the internet connectivity value chain. We now 
turn the discussion to this matter. 
3. PRICING WHOLESALE INTERNET ACCESS: INTERCONNECTION 
AGREEMENTS 
Interconnection is what makes the Internet “the network of networks”. The dominant economic driving 
force for interconnection between network providers is positive network externalities. Externalities result 
from connectivity [Baake and Wichmann, 1999], the possibility of every party connected to the Internet to 
be able to communicate with any other party, and from universal access, the possibility to have access to 
all network resources independently of the user’s physical location. Additionally, interoperability of 
heterogeneous technologies and user applications requires extensive connectivity. Further, dense 
interconnection facilitates packet routing though short paths and decreases the possibility of marginal loss, 
thus supporting the provision of Quality of Service (QoS). 
ISPs and IBPs aiming at exploiting the benefits of interconnection have been implementing two types of 
agreements, namely peering and transit. As a result, the exchange of Internet traffic operates with two 
parallel systems [Cukier, 1998]. Peering agreements involve the exchange of traffic between the users of 
two networks free of charge. When ISP A peers with ISP B, traffic originates in A’s (B’s) network and 
terminate in B’s (A’s) network. Transit payment agreements occur when a provider wants to reach 
customers of some third party that the he doesn't peer with. In this case he enters into transit agreement 
with another intermediary provider who is, in turn, interconnected to that part of the Internet. Neither 
peering or transit agreements guarantee quality of service. 
A peering agreement between two ISPs involves exchange occurring at public and private Internet 
exchange points. Partners only exchange traffic between them, at the exchange point nearest to origination 
and termination of transfer, on a settlement-free basis also known as sender-keeps-all. The only direct 
costs involved are the purchase of equipment and the provision of transmission capacity needed for each 
partner to meet the requirements deriving from peering. Figure 1 presents a simple representation of the 


















NAP: Network Access Point
 
Figure 1: Interconnectivity on the Internet 
Connectivity providers face conflicting incentives. On one hand, they have an incentive to cooperate with 
one another in order to provide their customers with access to the full range of Internet users and content. 
On the other hand, they have an incentive to compete with one another for both retail and wholesale 
customers. The strategies and growth of individual networks vary significantly and this has led to some 
breakdowns in the peering system. [Frieden, 1998] The exponential growth of the Internet has put 
enormous pressure on the backbones and on the interconnection points connecting the backbones. [Cremer 
et al., 1999]. As a result, performance is hampered at these points and peering often turns out to be inferior 
in terms of service quality.  
The alternative to peering agreements is transit payment agreements. There are two main differences 
between peering and transit. First, one partner pays another partner for interconnection and therefore 
becomes a wholesale customer. The partner selling transit services will route traffic from the transit 
customer to its own peering partners as well as to other customers [OECD, 1998]. Second, transit does not 
involve the same service as peering and, therefore, refusing peering in favour of transit is not a means of 
charging for a service that was otherwise provided free of charge. When regional ISPs pay for transit they 
benefit from the infrastructure investments of national or global backbones without themselves having to 
make the same investments. Transit gives an ISP access to the entire Internet, not just the customers of the 
peering partner, thus the transit provider must either maintain peering arrangements with a number of 
other backbones or must pay for transit from another backbone.  
Many ISPs have adopted a hybrid approach to interconnection, peering with a number of ISPs and paying 
for transit from one or more backbones in order to have access to those backbones they do not peer with 
[Kende and Oxman, 1999]. Interconnection agreements are also influenced by the dynamic nature of the 
Internet, which often leads to a form of arbitrage that is played behind the scenes by the different ISPs 
negotiating new interconnection agreements. For example an IBP that provides connectivity to smaller 
ISPs must also interconnect with other IBPs and act similarly to foreign exchange arbiters, as he seeks to Ioanna D. Constantiou, Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos 
extract revenue in both directions. The resultant business environment is one characterised by a degree of 
fluidity. Many network providers operate both as a client and as a provider [Huston 1999]. 
4. IMPLICATIONS FROM INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN INTERNET 
CONNECTIVITY MARKETS 
As indicated in earlier sections, bilateral transactions in the market for Internet connectivity (wholesale or 
retail) are characterised by severe information asymmetries [Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 1997]. 
Internet providers control all the information pertaining to the characteristics of their networks (e.g. 
capacity, usage etc.) and may or may not disclose it to potential interconnection partners. From an 
economic perspective, such information is critical for the structure and efficiency of interconnection 
agreements. Current practices are often based on the subjective perceptions of the parties involved and 
may not be optimal or sustainable because of asymmetrically available information. 
Asymmetric information in current types of interconnection agreements gives rise to opportunistic 
behaviour in different guises. The first is called “backbone free riding”. A national ISP has to build and 
maintain a nation-wide network, connecting different regions, whereas a local ISP, concentrating on a 
single region does not. If both ISPs agree to interconnect, the local ISP may use national ISP capacity to 
service traffic between customers in distant regions. For example, when a customer of the regional ISP 
requests a web page from a customer of the national backbone whose server is far away, the request will 
be carried through the national ISP, from one region to the other and the response back. The national ISP 
may thus refuse to peer on the grounds that it is bearing the expense for a national infrastructure that the 
regional ISP can exploit at no cost. As a result, a number of ISPs include in their publicly stated peering 
policies that potential peer partners should be willing and able to peer at a number of geographically 
dispersed locations [Ergas, 2000]. 
The second manifestation of opportunism is called “business stealing effect”. Interconnection naturally 
lowers end user switching costs. End customers may switch network providers seeking better 
price/performance ratios without losing connectivity or access to shared network resources. Lower 
switching costs increase competition and, as a result, weaken ISP incentives to interconnect [Shapiro and 
Varian, 1998]. An alternative strategy is to raise switching cost by differentiation. An ISP may bundle 
exclusive services or content to its main Internet access offering in order to achieve customer lock-in (e.g. 
AOL). 
Another example of perceived free riding that may arise in a peering relationship derives from the 
business strategy of an ISP. One ISP may choose for a variety of reasons to focus on providing service to 
users that generate high traffic volumes and use extensively the web servers of the peer ISP. In such cases 
the second ISP will carry extra traffic volume that will negatively affect its network performance, and 
decrease the quality of services provided to its own customers. If usage patterns are not reciprocal, peering 
is not sustainable.Opportunistic behaviour may also arise in transit agreements. When an ISP signs a 
transit agreement he is expecting to have global access to the Internet. It is, however, difficult to know the 
network coverage of his provider and the performance levels of its network. As ISPs are trying to increase 
their revenues through higher utilisation of their network, they often oversubscribe it. This behaviour in 
combination with best effort service provision may end up to increased delays and packet losses for client 
traffic. Thus, ISPs entering transit agreements do not always receive their expected benefits. 
When ISP A is not able to identify the type of ISP B, with respect to certain characteristics that will affect 
the outcome of an interconnection agreement, there is an adverse selection problem. The result might be 
that desirable interconnections may not be agreed or that agreements may be settled under unfair or Ioanna D. Constantiou, Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos 
inefficient conditions. The main information components that may be asymmetrically available to 
candidate interconnection partners include, among others, the following. 
•  The types of customers. Customer demand is notoriously unsystematic and difficult to predict. 
However, an ISP can obtain demographic and usage characteristics (as indicators of demand 
patterns) of its client base. Such information is not available to third parties. 
•  The volume of traffic exchanged. This information is directly related to customer demand, which 
is not predictable. However it is possible to simulate or estimate statistically demand patterns on 
the basis of historical data  [e.g. Gupta et al 2000]. 
•  Presence at peering points, other peering agreements and network management. Such 
information concerns the business strategy of the ISP and its core competence. An ISP has no 
incentive to reveal this type of information that will directly reveal the cost of managing its 
network. 
•  Available capacity and resource allocation. This information includes decisions on statistical 
multiplexing, overbooking, attracting new customers. Resource allocation has strong 
implications for network performance. 
Such information is critical during negotiations for peering or transit agreements. However, it is not 
readily available and ISPs have little incentive to reveal it or report it truthfully. Current market practices 
address this problem only in part. Large ISPs exert their bargaining power to extract such information 
from smaller potential partners. The requirements and terms of such agreements are privately 
communicated and undisclosed. 
Information asymmetries are also manifest in the form of moral hazard after an interconnection agreement 
is entered into. When ISP A is not able to observe or monitor the behaviour of ISP B after an 
interconnection agreement, ISP B may alter its behaviour opportunistically for its own private benefit and 
to the detriment of ISP A (or vice versa). Moral hazard arises as a result of actions such as the following. 
•  An ISP may not keep upgrading his network capacity after an interconnection agreement. This 
will result in poorer servicing of the partner’s traffic. As interconnection agreements currently 
are based on best effort services, such behaviour cannot be verified. 
•  An ISP may actively discriminate against IP packets that enter into his network from the 
interconnected partner when its network has high traffic. In the context of best effort services it 
is almost impossible to detect and verify such behaviour. 
•  An ISP may overbook its network in order to maximise economies of scale. To avoid congestion 
the ISP may delay or not admit interconnected traffic. This not the predictable outcome under 
‘naturally’ arising congestion but the result of intentional unilateral overbooking. 
Moral hazard appears because one ISP’s profit maximisation strategy may not be aligned with the interests 
of its interconnection partners and because he can hide or disguise his behaviour. The result is inefficient 
and unstable agreements. Incentive compatible contracts can be devised so as to safeguard interconnection 
agreements from opportunism and sustain the undeniable benefits of network externalities. 
 
5. PROPOSED RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Both peering and transit agreements often do not provide sufficient economic incentives for partners to 
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increasingly demanding in terms of specific network performance guarantees. We argue that new types of 
interconnection agreements based on contracts with incentive mechanisms, will mitigate the adverse 
implications of asymmetric information and will provide a sound basis for sustaining quality of service 
requirements. 
There are two main issues open to future research on interconnection agreements. 
•  How can an interconnection customer ensure receiving fair treatment in a best effort service network? 
•  What is the appropriate pricing scheme that will induce an interconnection provider to treat client 
traffic with more than best effort services? 
In order to apply the asymmetric information framework to the interconnection market, we identify the 
basic parameters in the Internet context. These parameters are effort, outcome and cost. 
The effort in this context can be defined as the ISP’s decision on how to treat the incoming traffic of a 
customer. When customer traffic enters the provider network a decision is taken on the path it will follow 
within it. This decision affects the quality of interconnection with respect to average delay and packet loss 
rate.  It is not observable by the customer, and the provider has no incentive to reveal it.  The inability to 
verify ISP effort can be alleviated by devising pricing mechanisms that provide suitable incentives to the 
ISP to exert such effort as to ensure the expected performance. In effect, such mechanisms make the ISP 
responsible for the effort he exerts by tying his payment to the outcome after accounting for uncertain 
conditions.  
We can assume that effort is defined in terms of the multiplexing algorithms applied by the ISP. 
Multiplexing algorithms can be manipulated to give different priorities to different kinds of packets 
according to subjective criteria. Such criteria may include, among others, the type of application being 
serviced (e.g. email vs. videoconferencing), the identity of the sender (or recipient) or the revenue 
generated by the traffic flow. 
The outcome in the internet context can be defined by performance indicators such as average delay or 
packet loss rates that are observable and provide quantitative measurements of interconnection quality.  
The cost of interconnection can be defined by taking into account network management criteria adopted 
and the multiplexing algorithms, selected by the ISP. An obvious definition of this cost is the opportunity 
cost of not serving (or reducing the quality of service for) other customers. An alternative but equivalent 
definition of this cost is in terms of negative externality (congestion) imposed on the network and its 
users. It is quite difficult to estimate this cost as it depends on parameters that an ISP may not reveal. A 
key parameter is the dynamic condition of the network, defined as the traffic load that is already in the 
network. This information is available to the provider before deciding how to treat incoming traffic. In this 
setting, the cost of effort is zero under some threshold traffic level and increases exponentially above that 
threshold. In turn, this threshold depends on total available capacity and on the multiplexing algorithm. 
To demonstrate a representative example, we assume that there are two networks A and B. Network B 
sells backbone connectivity to A via a transit agreement. Further, we assume that a customer of network A 
wants to set up videoconference with another party at a distant network. Videoconference packets will 
pass through network B. The application will generate revenue mainly to ISPA, who owns the customer 
who, in turn, will be willing to pay more in order to ensure the desired frame rate. Network B has a key 
role in service delivery. According to current types of interconnection agreements, ISPB will get no extra 
revenue and has no incentive to provide better performance. How can ISPA induce ISPB to provide 
performance guarantees or at least priority to its videoconference packets?  
We consider a simple case with two effort levels. ISPB maintains two virtual links of equal capacity. The 
average arrival rate is higher on the first link. Therefore the average delay rate will also be higher for Ioanna D. Constantiou, Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos 
packets forwarded through the first link. The second link is reserved for priority packets, has lower arrival 
rate and sustains lower delays. ISPA would like to induce ISPB to pass his packets through the priority link. 
However, ISPA is not able to monitor or verify ISPB effort.  ISPA will only observe the final outcome 
(delay or frame rate), which is expected to be the weighted average of the two different delay rates. The 
cost of ISPB depends on current traffic and on the extra delay that ISPA traffic will create on the specific 
link. This implies that there is an opportunity cost for carrying ISPA traffic through the priority link. Both 
ISPs are maximising their profits. ISPA prefers his traffic to go through the priority link whilst ISPB 
generally prefers to route traffic through the low priority link that has lower opportunity cost. At this point 
the analysis is more straightforward from the point of view of ISPB. The latter has to segment the market 
with such a price that only customers, who really value priority service, receive it. The price must be tied 
to observed frame rates while being higher than ISPB’s opportunity cost. The reality the problem is rather 
more complex because ISPB’s opportunity cost depends on the total demand for the priority link at the 
given moment in time. In a comprehensive model, the uncertainty regarding system-wide demand 
conditions and the risk preferences of the parties must also be taken into account. 
This is a sketch of a model that addresses the question of sustaining efficient interconnection agreements. 
It suggests that mechanisms similar to those studied for retail Internet access can be applied to wholesale 
markets. The aim is to propagate sufficient incentives throughout the connectivity value chain in order to 
deliver performance expectations to end-users. Clearly, formal modelling is warranted to explore the 
properties and behaviour of such mechanisms. Furthermore, multiple provider settings need to be 
modelled before broader conclusions can be drawn. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyses both retail and wholesale markets for internet connectivity, giving particular emphasis 
on the latter. After a brief overview of extant pricing policies and related research we believe that the role 
of information is critical when considering bilateral business relations in the Internet marketplace. 
Asymmetric information in current types of interconnection agreements gives rise to opportunistic 
behaviour with negative implications. Interconnection agreements exhibit great instability because of the 
difficulties in enforcing them. Both peering and transit agreements do not provide sufficient incentives for 
partners to collaborate on exploiting positive network externalities. Our research approach is aimed at 
addressing adverse selection and moral hazard in interconnection agreements directly, with a view to 
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